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SOUTH PACIFIC LAND LAW: SOME 
REGIONAL CHALLENGES, CASES AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Sue Farran* 
Land in the South Pacific is largely regulated by introduced English Common Law. However, the 
vast bulk of the land in the region is held under different forms of customary land tenure, and the 
perceptions of land and its use are distinctly regional.  In this article, the author considers how the 
Common Law has been adapted in the region to accommodate and reflect customary law and practice.  
Selected cases from the region are used to highlight the difficulties that the courts face in blending 
Common Law principles with customary practice and accommodating changing uses of land that 
challenge traditional solutions.    
I INTRODUCTION 
A Common Law lawyer coming to the South Pacific region hoping to understand land law 
faces a number of challenges.  One of these is that the apparent acceptance of a number of 
Common Law concepts and principles is deceptive. In the law of property in the region, there 
is much that seems to be familiar.  Often this can be explained by the fact that many of the 
available and documented sources of material are introduced law or are modelled on 
introduced law.  Introduced law, however, governs only a very small percentage of total land  
 
  
*  Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of the South Pacific.  I am extremely grateful to Professor 
Tony Angelo and Professor Don Patterson for their helpful comments.  The errors and views remain 
mine alone. 
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holding in the region.1  Nevertheless introduced concepts from English Common Law are used 
to explain and give form to a number of issues – including those concerning customary land 
and land tenure - which come before the courts, especially appellate courts, where the 
procedures are those of introduced rather than customary law, and the personnel are more 
familiar with Common Law principles of land law than customary ones.2  As a result of this 
process there appears to be a degree of accommodation of customary law and traditional 
practices relating to land and introduced concepts and structures.  What is beginning to 
emerge is a unique regional jurisprudence which blends the context and traditions of the 
region with the language and form of introduced law, upon which the foundations of a new 
Pacific land law may be based. 
This article considers some of the issues presented by selected cases to this process of 
accommodation and reformulation.  These cases are drawn from the region of the University of 
the South Pacific,3 and reflect some of the difficulties presented to the courts in articulating 
legal solutions where either there are challenges to certain fundamental Common Law 
principles of land law posed by different regional perceptions of land and its use, or where the 
changing use of land presents challenges to traditional solutions.  Pragmatic solutions to these 
legal questions demonstrate that the Common Law, in its least abstract sense, as a law of the 
people, can survive and thrive with a little judicial nurturing and creativity. 
II FEATURES OF CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE  
It is not the aim of this article to elaborate in depth on different forms of customary land 
tenure. That has been done elsewhere by writers better qualified to do so.4  However, in order 
  
1  The two major estates of English Common Law post 1925, freehold and leasehold, are found in the 
region but freehold is very limited.  The total freehold holding in the region is probably less than 20 
per cent (10 per cent in Fiji; 6 per cent in Samoa; 1.5 per cent in Papua New Guinea and perhaps 1 per 
cent in Kiribati)  Leasehold is more widely spread but the bulk of land is held under different forms of 
customary land tenure. 
2  Although there are a number of regional judges who sit on the bench they and the lawyers who appear 
before them have usually received their legal training outside the region.  The first law graduates from 
the School of Law of the University of the South Pacific, which focuses on training regional lawyers, 
only graduated in 1997. 
3  This is the region of the 12 member nations of the University: Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, Tuvalu, Samoa, 
Nauru, Niue, Kiribati, Tokelau, the Federated Sates of Micronesia, Cook Islands and  Marshall Islands. 
4  See for example, Ron Crocombe (ed) Land Tenure in the Atolls (Institute of Pacific Studies of the 
University of the South Pacific, Fiji, 1987). 
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to understand some of the challenges that come before the courts it is necessary to appreciate 
that customary land tenure has certain features which distinguish it from Common Law 
principles relating to land. 
Difficulties can arise not only as to what is meant by "land", but also regarding the nature of 
rights over land.  The latter is an important issue because traditional use of land for subsistence 
agriculture is changing in many parts of the region. Greater economic exploitation is taking 
place.  While customary land tenure may have been well suited to provide a legal framework 
for customary land use, it faces challenges when the benefit of land changes from cultivation 
and gathering to hard cash. 
A What is Land? 
Land is important in the Pacific region but it is not valued in the same way as Europeans 
might value land.  For example, it has been suggested that Solomon Islanders measure the 
value of land "in terms of its social, economic and political significance in society",5 and that in 
Vanuatu: "It [land] represents life, materially and spiritually".6 
The English Common Law describes land in a number of ways.  Halsbury, for example, 
describes land as including: 7 
Any ground, soil or earth, such as meadows, pastures, woods, moors, waters, marshes and heath; 
houses and other buildings upon it; the air space above it, and all mines and minerals beneath it.  It 
also includes anything fixed to the land, as well as growing trees and crops. 
Common characteristics attributed to land are that it is indestructible and immovable.  It 
includes the space above the land and the ground under the surface.8  It also includes 
riverbeds and the seashore as far as the mean low water mark. It includes things which are 
  
5  Colin H Allan Report of the Special Commission on Customary Land Tenure in the British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate (17 June 1957). 
6  Jöel Bonnemaison in Peter Larmour (ed) Land Tenure in Vanuatu (Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva (Fiji), 
1986).  Consideration of the historical approach in the second part of this article indicates that there are 
echoes of this in the Common Law.  Certainly the maxim "An Englishman's home is his castle" meant 
more than just bricks and soil. 
7  Halsbury's Laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1998) vol 39(2), Real Property, para 76, 65. 
8  Epitomized in the well-worn maxim "He who owns the land owns everything extending to the 
heavens and the depths of the earth". 
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attached to the ground or sufficiently annexed to it9 and land which arises by accretion.  What 
land is, therefore, would seem to be fairly well established. 
 
Nevertheless there are regional problems with these descriptions, as illustrated by the case 
of Allardyce Lumber Company Limited v Laore10 and Combined Fera Group and Three Others v 
Attorney General from the Solomon Islands.11 
1 Land and sea 
Both the above cases concerned land covered by sea – that is, below the mean low water 
mark. 
In Allardyce Lumber Company Limited v Laore, the Court held that land meant the opposite of 
sea, so that the seabed was not included within the Common Law definition of "land covered 
with water" which was limited to land under lakes and non-tidal rivers.  Ward CJ was 
prepared to find that: "Some customary rights can exist over the sea and such customary rights 
can supplant the Common Law position". 
The onus, however, was on the defendant to establish a customary right over the reefs and 
reclaimed land in question.  Consequently submerged reefs could not be the subject of 
customary land ownership. 
In Combined Fera Group there was a dispute as to whether land covered by water could be 
the subject of customary ownership. The Common Law introduced into Solomon Islands 
excluded land permanently covered by the sea.  The seabed, or reefs under water could not be 
part of native customary "land".  In 1964,12 land was redefined to include "land covered by 
water".  This did not immediately answer the question of whether the seabed could now be 
included in land.  However under the Land and Titles Act,13 title to land below the mean low 
water mark was vested in the Commissioner of Lands as owner of public land.  
 
9  Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit – whatever is attached to the ground becomes a part of it. 
10  Allardyce Lumber Company Limited v Laore (18 August 1989) High Court Solomon Islands Civil Case No 
64/1989 <http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/> (last accessed 27 October 2001). 
11  Combined Fera Group and Three Others v Attorney General (19 November 1997) High Court Solomon 
Islands Land Appeal Case No 4/1993 <http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 27 October 
2001). 
12  Under the Land and Titles (Amendment) Act 1964 (Solomon Islands). 
13  Land and Titles Act (Solomon Islands) Cap 93. 
 
 SOUTH PACIFIC LAND LAW 957 
The Magistrate's Court, hearing an appeal against the decision of the acquisition officer, 
held that under the old Land and Titles Ordinance 1963,14 the Land and Titles (Amendment) 
Act15 and the new Land and Titles Act,16 land below the mean low water mark was not land 
for the purposes of customary land.  Such land therefore vested in the Commissioner of Lands 
as public land.17  On appeal to the High Court it was argued that the Common Law doctrine 
regarding land permanently covered by water was inconsistent with Solomon Island 
legislation.  If such land was not "land" then it could not be registered as public land.  For the 
legislation to be effective the meaning of land had to be redefined.  If land was redefined then 
the dispute was whether there were any rights or interests that any person might have in 
respect of native customary land which the Commissioner of Lands would have to consider. 
The definition of "native land" first found in the Kings Regulations18 and then the Land and 
Titles Ordinance 196319 included: "Any land lawfully owned, used or occupied by a person or 
community in accordance with current native usage". Land was defined to include: "land 
covered with water, or any buildings on land, or any cellar, sewer drain, or culvert in or under 
land".  It did not include "land covered by the sea at mean low water". 
In the 1964 amended definition of land this limitation was omitted.  Palmer J had to decide 
therefore if the definition of "land covered by water" could include land covered by sea.  He 
held that if such land was capable of public ownership, then it followed that such land could 
be capable of customary ownership through claims of customary use or occupation. To hold 
that the seabed was "land" for the purposes of one area of the law and not the other was a 
  
14  Land and Titles Ordinance 1963 (Solomon Islands) Cap 56. 
15  Land and Titles (Amendment) Act (Solomon Islands) No 22 of 1964. 
16  Land and Titles Act (Solomon Islands) Cap 93. 
17  Under s 10(4) of the Lands and Titles Act (Solomon Islands) Cap 93, a perpetual estate in "land" is 
capable of being registered by the Commissioners of Land.  Land under this section includes that 
below the mean low water mark; and between the points of mean high water and mean low water.  
This power vests in the Land Commissioner under s 47 of the Land and Titles Ordinance 1962 
(Solomon Islands) Cap 56 (repealed).  This Act vested in the Commissioner as public land all land 
below mean low water, the sea shore and land between high and low water that is, the foreshore and 
the seabed. 
18  Kings Regulations (Solomon Islands) Cap 49. 
19  Land and Titles Ordinance 1963 (Solomon Islands) Cap 56. 
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nonsense.20  This contradicts the decision of Ward CJ in Allardyce Lumber Company.  However, 
statute had already ousted the Common Law definition of land in which land covered by 
water did not include the seabed, by vesting land below the mean low water mark in the 
Commissioner of lands as public land.  Once the disputed area was held to be land then the 
question was whether there was any evidence of ownership, use or occupation demonstrated 
by the appellants which would prevent such land being registered as public land. 
In fact native usage of the seabed and in particular reefs had been long established in 
Solomon Islands.  From the 1920s trochus shell was being harvested by diving and collecting 
these shells from the reef-beds.21  These were sold to non-Solomon Island traders who 
exported them.  In 1951 the question of ownership rights over the reef of Tavaru Island had 
been decided by the Judicial Commissioner in favour of the customary owners.22  The 
defendant in that case relied on the Common Law right of the public to fish over the foreshore.  
The court accepted that this was the English law relevant in the circumstances, but even in 
England such law would recognise and could be limited by local customs in certain situations 
and subject to certain criteria.  These were that: 
• The custom was different or contrary to Common Law; 
• There was certainty as to locality of application and to whom it applied and how; 
• The custom had existed since time immemorial – or in the case of Solomon Islands, 
before 1893, when the English Common Law was introduced into the Protectorate; 
• It had been observed without interruption; 
• It had been reasonable at the time of its inception; 
• It was not inconsistent with any enacted law. 
What had happened in Solomon Islands was that measures had been implemented to 
declare land, which was not either customary land, public land, registered land or land 
  
20  My words, not those of Palmer J. 
21  Frank Kabui "Crown ownership of Foreshores and seabed in Solomon Islands" (1997) 21 The Journal of 
Pacific Studies 123. 
22  Hanasiki v OJ Symes  cited in Kabui, above n 21.  Symes, a European had instructed his servants to dive 
for trochus without the permission of Hanasiki.  A declaration of rights of ownership was granted to 
Hanasiki. 
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occupied or used by anyone for 25 years prior to 1958, as vacant land.  This vacant land was 
then registered as public land.  It was these measures which gave rise to subsequent disputes. 
2  Native land determined by nature of rights 
In the Combined Fera case, the test applied by the court was to determine which of the 
Appellants had demonstrated rights of ownership, use or occupation.  The Common Law 
allows for land to be owned by one person and used or occupied by another or a number of 
others.  In the Combined Fera case it was apparent that the nature of the interest would define 
the category of land in question.  In other words, use and or occupation defines what land is 
for the purposes of "native land".23  This does not necessarily mean that such an interest 
amounts to ownership.  Nevertheless the case suggested that if the magistrate, to whom the 
case was remitted, found that the appellants has such use or occupation at the relevant time, 
then this would prevent the land vesting in the Lands Commissioner as owner.24  This would 
not necessarily be because the land was already owned – although that is the implication – but 
because it was native land.  From this it might be suggested that "ownership" and customary 
land tenure are not so much incompatible as synonymous.  The Common Law abhors a 
vacuum and seeks to establish the true owner – from whom other rights flow.  Customary law 
sees no vacuum because if land is "native land" then that is the starting point from which other 
rights flow. 
3 Re-claimed land 
The above cases were complicated by the fact that the land in dispute was reclaimed land.  
If the seabed and foreshore could be customary land then the procedure for acquisition  - here 
for the construction of a wharf - was rather different than if it could not.25  The distinction 
between reclamation and accretion has been recognised elsewhere in the Common Law with 
  
23  As in the original Kings Regulations (Solomon Islands) Cap 49 where it is stated that native land 
"means land owned by natives or subject to the exercise by natives of customary rights of occupation, 
cultivation or other uses". 
24  Section 47(5) of the Land and Titles Ordinance 1963 (Solomon Islands) Cap 56 provides that s 47(1) 
(vesting the seabed and foreshore in the Commissioner) would not apply if the land " comprised in an 
interest of which any person becomes or is entitled to become registered as owner pursuant to the provisions of 
the Second Schedule, or to any native customary land" (Emphasis added). 
25  In Francis Waleilia & Others v David Totorea it was held, applying the Laore case, that reclaimed land was 
not customary land as it had been previously an area permanently under water.  These cases are cited 
in Kabui, above n 21. 
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the suggestion that it is possible for the Crown to have ownership over reclaimed land as a 
consequence of Crown ownership of the foreshore, with the riparian owners having concurrent 
interests over the foreshore.26  However Palmer J indicated that this depended on the interest 
exercised over the foreshore prior to reclamation.  If it was vested in the Crown then it 
remained the Crown's and any customary rights were by way of a licence. 
4 Land and accretion 
The Common Law principles regarding accretion of land also raise some interesting 
problems.27  Under the Common Law, gradual accretions to land and alluvial land belong to 
the person who owns the land adjacent to the sea.  The requirements for accretion are that the 
changes take place "slowly, gradually and by imperceptible increase".28  In the Pacific region 
not only may accretion be sudden, but it may be over an area where there are already other 
"property" rights.  This occurred in the case of Nariki Kautu v Makirita Rinikarawa & Others in 
Kiribati.29  Here accretion took place across a lagoon.  A dispute arose between the different 
riparian owners as to who owned the land, which, by the time of the dispute, joined opposite 
sides of the lagoon.  The appellant claimed a stronger right owing to having previously had a 
fish trap in the water now displaced by accretion.  The question for the court was whether a 
customary right to set fish traps could be converted to right to title to land.  Here it was held 
that there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim.30 Had there been sufficient 
evidence as to the nature of the right to set fish traps then it may well have been that the case 
would have been decided differently and the right to use the land – in this case the sea bed – in 
a particular way could have given rise to a right to the land gained by accretion. 
  
26  Attorney General of Southern Nigeria v John Holt & Company (Liverpool) Ltd and Others [1915] AC 599 (PC). 
27  Accretion is not uncommon in the region as evidenced by statutory provisions to take it into account, 
for example the Native Lands Ordinance introduced by the Native Lands (Amendment) No 2 Act 1983 
of Kiribati specifically provides for accretion and erosion in the case of lease and sub leases (s 12(2). 
28  Sudden accretions belong in Common Law to the Crown. 
29  Nariki Kautu v Makirita Rinikarawa & Others (1986) High Solomon Islands Land Appeal Case No 
13/1986. 
30  In Common Law the right to set fishtraps might have been considered under a profit à prendre or a 
licence coupled with a grant, but these concepts – which one might think quite useful in the region – 
seem to be underdeveloped. 
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5 Land and crops 
It should also be noted that "land" in the customary context of the region often excludes 
trees, crops and even buildings.  For example, in the case of Kosrae State v Molid Telenoa,31 
which was a larceny case from the Federated States of Micronesia, it was stated that crops on 
land, even before harvesting, are considered the personal property of the person planting 
them.  The Court had to overcome the problem posed by the Common Law that growing crops 
were part of the land and therefore incapable of being the subject matter of larceny – which 
only applied to personal property.  The Court chose to follow developments in American law 
which avoided the fine distinction between the cutting of crops and taking them away – which 
was not larceny – and the picking up of cut crops which was.  The Court also took into account 
traditional practices and customs of Kosrae State, where short term cash crops were generally 
regarded as being the property of the person who cultivated them – regardless of ownership of 
the land.  Consequently the Court rejected the historical approach of the Common Law and 
held that sugar cane was the personal property of the person who cultivated it.32 
Trees have similarly been held to be personal property rather than part of the land, on the 
grounds that they are agricultural crops, or by finding an implied or express agreement 
allowing another to enter and cultivate land, or because the trees have already been felled.33  
The right to grant timber rights or negotiate logging contracts may however, be rights held by 
landowners, or be rights only partly assigned by landowners.34 
The distinction regarding things growing on land is important, particularly where crops 
represent the major or indeed only commercially exploitable asset.  In Fiji there is special 
legislation for "crop liens" whereby a debt can be secured against planted crops.35  The lienee 
has a lien over the crops produced by the lienor.  The crop lien survives the sale of the land, but 
  
31  Kosrae State v Molid Telenoa (14 December 1989) Kosrae State Court Criminal Case No 76-89 
<http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
32  Interestingly the Court also rejected the defence of communality as regards the crops, the argument of 
the accused being that the land was his fathers and therefore his as were the original crops. 
33  Billy Ringalea v Daniel Karoa (22 May 1997) High Court Solomon Islands, Civil Case No 90/1996 
<http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
34  See for example the use of the terms "primary" and "secondary" right holders in the case of Zephaniah 
Kinisita v Orkley Ramolele and Augustine Maemarine (30 September 1996) High Court Solomon Islands 
Land Appeal Case No 1/1996 <http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
35  Crop Liens Act (Fiji) Cap 226. 
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is not an interest in land.  Nevertheless the transferee of the land takes subject to it and does 
not have the right to harvest crops subject to such a lien.  In the case of Jai Wati v Baswa Nand & 
Others it was clearly stated that "a crop lien is not a profit à prendre and is not an encumbrance 
within the meaning of the term as it appears in the Land Transfer Act (Cap 131)".36 
The distinction is also important because it is very difficult to encumber communally 
owned land with a mortgage, or to charge it as security for a debt. Holding that certain aspects 
of land are personal property means that they can be considered as eligible assets to use as 
security for financial advances. 
6  Land and buildings 
Whether buildings on land are sufficiently fixed to the land to be part of it also raises some 
interesting questions, partly because of the nature of building construction in the region, which 
is very varied, and partly because custom recognised that non-owners of the land may have the 
right to build on it.  The Common Law principle that buildings attached to the land are part of 
the land, was followed by default in the case of Keke Itimwemwe v Karua Tekina in Kiribati where 
it was held that there was insufficient evidence of customary law to displace the Common Law 
principle.37  However, in the Tongan case of Bank of Tonga v Vaka'vta it was held that a motel 
was not a house but personal property and was therefore liable to be seized by bailiffs under a 
distraining order.38 This distinction was significant because a house, where used as a home, 
was exempt from such seizures as was other personal property, including growing crops and 
fixtures.39  The distinction here seems to have abandoned the Common Law niceties regarding 
the mode of attachment or affixation and considered more pragmatically what property could 
be seized to meet the demands of creditors. 
B The Categorisation of Land 
Besides the question of defining land, there are also problems regarding the categorisation 
of land. One of the categories of land introduced into the region has been that of "waste and 
vacant land". 
  
36  Jai Wati v Baswa Nand & Others (21 November 1997) High Court Fiji Civil Action No 29/1997. 
37  Keke Itimwemwe v Karua Tekina (25 March 1997) Court of Appeal Kiribati Land Appeal Case No 4/1996 
<http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
38  Bank of Tonga v Vaka'vta [1994] Tonga Law Reports 25. 
39  Magistrates Court Act (Tonga), s 59(d). 
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In the region, it is not unusual for land to be abandoned for long periods of time.  Reference 
is made to this in the case of Noel v Toto in which Kent J held that: "custom ownership is not 
related to current or continuous occupation in land".40  Similarly, in the case of Bue Manie and 
Kenneth Kaltabang v Sato Kilman Cooke CJ held:41 
In custom, it is accepted that the custom owner is the descendant of the person who first came here 
and built a Nasara.  It makes no difference whether they left again for one reason or another, the 
fact that they were the first occupants of the land and built a Nasara there gives them the right to be 
designated as the custom owners. 
If customary ownership is perpetual, then leaving the land does not divest the owners of 
their ownership.  It is also clear that in most of the region occupation rights can be held by 
different persons than those having ownership rights, just as ownership can exist without 
occupation.  Both can exist simultaneously and harmoniously. 
To categorise land as waste and vacant is akin to categorising it as res nullius that is, 
property belonging to no one.  Such categorisation justified the taking of land by the colonial 
powers under legislation or powers dedicated to that purpose, for example the Land and Titles 
Regulation of 1959 in the Solomon Islands.  Such land was then exploited either for agricultural 
development by the granting of leases or for public benefit. 
Problems with the conceptual framework of such legislation soon became apparent.  In 
1964 the Land and Titles Ordinance had to be amended because the definition of "native 
customary land" failed to take into account that Solomon Islanders regarded almost all land 
which had not been alienated to foreigners, as subject to native interests even if it had not been 
used or cultivated for many years.  Consequently in Solomon Islands about 40,000 acres of land 
declared waste and vacant were found to be occupied under native custom and returned to the 
customary owners.42  
  
40  Noel v Toto (30 May 1995) Supreme Court Vanuatu Civil Case No 18/1994, 6 
<http//www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
41  Bue Manie and Kenneth Kaltabang v Sato Kilman (5 July 1983) Supreme Court Vanuatu Land Case No 
L5/1984 <http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
42  Frank Kabui "Crown ownership of foreshores and seabed in Solomon Islands" (1997) The Journal of 
Pacific Studies 123, 124.  In 1968 further amendments were made to the Land and Titles Act. 
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C Rights and Interests in Land 
1 Individual or communal rights? 
Customary land tenure and introduced land law recognise different interests in land.  
These can come into conflict. 
Firstly, customary ownership of land is rarely the right of an individual, but of a group.43  
Recognition of this can be found in American Samoa in the case of Tufele Liamatua v Mose in 
which it was held that "Samoan communal ownership of land does not confer any personal 
individual right of ownership".44 
Where an individual does appear to be the owner, this is likely to only be in a 
representative capacity, a point recognised in the Vanuatu case of John Noel v Toto.45  There, 
Kent J considering an earlier judgment of Cooke CJ, was faced by the problem that customary 
land was incapable of individual ownership, so that a person declared the owner of land 
following the resolution of a title dispute, owned in a representative capacity only. It was 
moreover difficult, according to Kent J, to translate the entire concept of customary ownership 
into Common Law principles, which, even though land my be held by way of an estate or 
tenure originally granted by the Crown, operates with an understanding that ownership is "a 
right fostered and protected by law for the exclusive use, enjoyment and disposal of a thing".46 
While ownership by more than one person or by a corporation can be accommodated by 
the Common Law, a multiplicity of owners in the abstract tends to be discouraged.47 
  
43  The problem of group rather than individual land rights is addressed in a paper by Kenneth Brown 
"The Language of Land: Look Before You Leap" (2000) Journal of South Pacific Law 
<www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
44  Tufele Liamatua v Mose (22 June 1988) High Court American Samoa Land and Titles Division 
<http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
45  Noel v Toto, above n 40. 
46   RS Bhalla "Legal Analysis of the Right of Property" (1981) 10 Anglo American Law Review 180.  It can 
be argued, certainly in respect to Common Law, that use and enjoyment are synonomous. 
47  See for example, the Law of Property Act 1925 (UK), which restricts the number of legal co-owners 
who may appear on the title to land. 
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2 Past, present and future rights 
There is also a temporal dimension to customary land holding which is not so evident in 
Common Law.48  Land represents a continuum between ancestors, current users and occupiers 
and future generations.  The significance of this, as stated in the case Tufele Liamatua v Mose is 
that "[c]ommunal lands are not freely alienable on the market".49 
Similarly in the above case of John Noel v Toto Kent J found that "[t]he nature of custom 
ownership is that the land cannot be actually disposed of.  It is retained for the benefit of future 
generations".50 
Effectively custom ownership is perpetual.51  Invariably the right to dispose of the land is 
restricted, not only as to who may dispose of it, but also to whom.  For example, in Kiribati in 
the case of Teretia Timi v Meme Tong52 it was held that a custom owner of land could sell land, a 
pit or a fish pond, but under section 14 of the Native Lands Code, the agreement of the 
vendor's next of kin was required as well as the approval of the court.53  Similar restrictions 
may be placed on testamentary gifts of land. The Native Lands Code in Kiribati allows gifts to 
be made only to certain recipients on recognised grounds.54  In the American Samoan case of 
Liamatua v Mose55 it was recognised that "title" could pass from one family to another through 
  
48  Although concepts such as "successors in title", "time immemorial", and, historically "entailed fees" are 
part of the language of Common Law, and the grant of a "fee simple absolute in possession" certainly 
extends beyond the current grantee. 
49  Tufele Liamatua v Mose, above n 44. 
50  Noel v Toto, above n 40.  
51  The Constitution of Vanuatu, art 75 states: "Only indigenous citizens of the Republic who have 
acquired their land in accordance with a recognised system of land tenure shall have perpetual 
ownership of their land". 
52  Teretia Timi v Meme Tong (25 March 1997) Court of Appeal Kiribati Land Appeal No 1/1996 
<http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
53  See also for example, Native Lands Trust Act 1978 (Fiji) Cap 134, s 4(1); Daniel v Cook and Others (1971) 
Nauru Land Appeal No 1 B33, where it was held that agreement from the family was required before 
land could be alienated. 
54  Tooma Tokintekai v Tabotika Obera (21 March 1997) Court of Appeal Kiribati Land Appeal No 6/1996 
<http://www.vanautu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 2001). 
55  Tufele Liamatua v Mose, above n 44. 
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the latter's adverse long-term use, and by conveyance – provided there was consent by the 
family and certain statutory provisions were complied with.56 
3 Transfer of rights to land 
Although there are limits to individual property rights and the free alienability of land in 
customary law it appears that in a number of cases land can be transferred, especially between 
family members.  For example in the case of Noel v Toto, Kent J found that "it is accepted that 
the head of the family can give land to members of the family and that once it is given, that 
person is regarded as the custom owner of that piece of land". 
Indeed it is not unusual to find parties to a dispute basing a claim of title to land on a 
previous gift or grant.  What is less clear is whether these grants – which are to a degree 
discretionary and may be revoked in the case of undeservedness – are perpetual or only for 
life.  The extent or existence of the donor's reversionary interest is also unclear. 
Some freedom to alienate rights in or over land is increasingly important in the region 
because of the economic benefits to be gained from doing so.  For example, in the case of 
logging contracts and the granting of leases, there is clearly some form of disposal.  Whether 
the interests disposed of flow from ownership is not always clear.  This illustrates a third point.  
Customary law accomodates a number of simultaneous interests over land.  For example, in 
the Solomon Island's case of Tovua v Meki there was a dispute as to entitlement to logging 
royalties.57  The difficulty was that timber rights were distinct from land ownership. What was 
unclear was whether they were sufficiently distinct so as to entitle those who held timber 
rights to grant logging contacts to third parties without consultation with the landowners.  This 
led to the possibility that the landowners could find themselves owners of a wasteland.  The 
legislation was framed so as to facilitate logging contracts and sought to simplify matters for 
investors by identifying a limited class of people with whom agreements had to be made.58  
Clearly the Act was inspired by the same sort of considerations which one finds behind much 
colonial land legislation, namely facilitation of marketability of land and its resources.  What 
the Act did not do was to indicate the relationship between the timber right holders and the 
landowners.  Although the Court found that representatives of such rights may be loosely 
  
56  As happened in Satele v Afoa (1930) 1 ASR 424 and Mauga v Soliai (1954) 3 ASR 108 cited in the above 
case of Tufele Liamatua v Mose, above n 44. 
57  Tovua v Meki  (3 November 1989) High Court Solomon Islands Civil Case No 141/1989. 
58  Forest Resources and Timber Utilisation Act (Solomon Islands) Cap 40. 
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referred to as "trustees" by the area councils who rule on their identity, this was not stipulated 
in the Act.  Following previous case law,59 Ward CJ held that the Council took the money (the 
royalties) under a "constructive trust".  He went on to recognise however, that there was no 
guidance as to how they were to carry out this fiduciary role.  Moreover, it appears from his 
obiter statement that even the imposition of a constructive trust was doubtful – as well it might 
be with no legal precedent or clarification – as it would be possible:60 
For one member of a tribe to enter into an agreement and take and use the royalties without 
consultation with, or the knowledge of, those other members of the tribe who live in isolated parts 
of the land and depend on the land entirely. 
4 Changing use of land 
The existence of a number of interests in land can co-exist without a problem when those 
interests relate to different forms of agricultural use.  For example one group may have rights 
of cultivation and another rights of harvesting fruits.  Or one group may have the right of 
ownership and another the right of occupation.  Problems arise when the land is taken out of 
traditional use and in effect rendered useless.  This arose in the case of Zephaniah Kinisita v 
Orkley Ramolele and Augustine Maemarine.61  In this case there were both primary and secondary 
right holders concerning the land in question.  The primary right holders owned the land as 
customary owners and the secondary right holders had rights of gardening and cultivation.  
The primary right holders wished to grant a lease over the land for the building of a school.  
Clearly this would take it out of production for the secondary right holders.  Muria CJ ranked 
the primary right holders first, holding that they alone had the right to decide whether to grant 
a lease or not.  However, he held that the secondary right holders could not be ignored but 
must be taken into account because "[i]n the Solomon Islands context nobody is landless, 
whether that be in terms of ownership or just usufructary right which is closely associated with 
the right of occupation". 
  
59  Allardyce and Others v Attorney General and Others [1988/89] SILR 78 (HC Solomon Islands). 
60  Problems relating to trusts and especially the accountability of trustees are discussed by Kenneth. 
Brown. 
61 Zephaniah Kinisita v Orkley Ramolele and Augustine Maemarine (30 September 1996) High Court Solomon 
Islands Land Appeal Case No 1/1996 <http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj> (last accessed 15 November 
2001). 
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In order to accommodate both sets of rights within the change of land use which the lease 
would bring about, the judge held that these right holders should be included as trustees of the 
money realised by the lease.  He did not apportion the beneficial interest but left this to the 
Acquisition Officer or the Magistrates Court.  Although the judge's articulation of trust 
principles in the case is unclear – he refers to the secondary right holders as "trustees, although 
not on an equal share basis"62 - it is evident that the communal and simultaneous rights 
enjoyed in custom are being recognised and upheld through the institution of the trust, here a 
trust of the lease money. 
The exchange of land for income presents particular challenges in the region. 
This is exemplified in the case of Noel v Toto.63 The land in question was a very beautiful, 
unspoilt white sand beach on the northern island of Espiritu Santo in Vanuatu.  The idyllic 
setting was an attraction for visiting cruise ships, which would put in at the beach in order for 
tourists to enjoy the location.  This generated income.  Although the original dispute had been 
about land, it became one about money generated by the land.  Customary law relating to land 
offers little assistance as to what is to happen in such circumstances.  The Constitution states 
that the rules of customary shall form the basis or ownership and use of land in the Republic of 
Vanuatu.64  While other members of a customary owner's family could request customary land 
to use, Kent J found that this "right" was not a "legal right" in the Common Law sense because 
it was not enforceable.  What sort of right was it?  In the Common Law it might be regarded as 
equivalent to the right an object of a discretionary power has, except that it was not clear what 
power Obed Toto had.  The Court found that he was a customary owner of land, but as a 
representative of his family not in his own right.65  However he had the right to decide what 
areas of land each member could have for customary use.  The members of the group were also 
owners and therefore entitled to the benefits of the land. 
  
62  The report of the case seems to confound the trustees management powers with the beneficial owners 
interests. Poor articulation of trust principles is a problem in the region and worthy of a separate 
paper, but too large a topic to be engaged on here. 
63  Noel v Toto , above n 40. 
64  Constitution of Vanuatu, art 74. 
65  He was also described as a "manager", "representative" and "custom owner" but at no point as 
"trustee". 
 
 SOUTH PACIFIC LAND LAW 969 
A further problem was that while in custom there was evidence of discrimination in the 
allocation of land between male and female claimants, the Constitution of Vanuatu confers 
fundamental rights relating to freedom from discrimination and the right not to be deprived of 
property.66  The problem was compounded by provisions under article 74 of the Constitution 
that rules of custom are to form the basis of ownership and use of land in Vanuatu.  The right 
to share in the income of the land was derived from rights as customary owners but also 
differed from customary rights in so far as first, the income had to be able to be used and could 
not be kept in perpetuity for future generations as land would be, and second, the allocation of 
such income could not be discriminatory on the grounds of sex, but must be fair and 
reasonable. 
The Court also had to consider that whereas it might be possible to support a number of 
people on the same land through communal rights and different types of rights over the same 
land, this was not possible with money.  If the money were distributed too widely it would be 
of no practical use.  The approach adopted in this case was to limit distribution to the highest 
level of descent and divide the money equally between these people. 
The judge in this case was careful to point out that if the income were generated through 
labour on the land, such as the cultivation and selling of crops, this would not have to be 
shared among others.  Some tricky distinctions are made here.  For example income from 
logging is bracketed with income from tourism, which leaves unanswered questions as to the 
cultivation of trees or the selling of natural or manufactured produce to tourists.  A modern 
interpretation of the rationale behind this distinction, was given by Kent J, who held: 
A person is not to be deprived of that income which they generate from their own ideas and 
labours.  The incentive to develop must not be stifled.  Family members equally ought not to be 
able to sit back and derive the benefits of the work and initiative of others. 
III CONCLUSION 
The above cases reflect some of the challenges which come before the appeal courts of the 
region when trying to accommodate the traditional aspects of Pacific land law within 
recognisable Common Law concepts.  Customary law and traditional forms of land tenure 
remain enormously important in the region and this has to be recognized not only in 
  
66  Constitution of Vanuatu 1980, ch 2. 
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customary dispute forums but also in the higher courts.  This is particularly important if legal 
decisions are to be acceptable.  As stated by Kent J in Noel v Toto:67 
Custom ownership is of course, not only concerned with the financial benefits of the land.  It is 
concerned with the tradition and culture of the people themselves.  This must continue to be 
recognised. 
At the same time, as indeed is evident in Noel v Toto, development and change are creating 
new problems and challenges for customary land tenure.  In the cases considered a degree of 
pragmatism is evident along with a desire to provide some firm foundations for future 
developments relating to land and the law that governs it.  Regional Common Law – as 
articulated through the courts – must accommodate local realities and embrace and provide for 
changes, especially where legislation is unable to or legislators are reluctant to introduce 
reforms.68  
At the same time it is apparent that not all English law principles of land law fit in.  For 
example, the rule against perpetuities has been held to have no application to communal land 
because the policy behind the rule – seeking to remove fetters on the free marketability of 
property – has no place in a system where land is not on the market.69  Also, a rule which 
seeks to avoid remoteness of vesting of title is inapplicable when title vests permanently in the 
extended family, even if the identity of members of that family may cause problems from time 
to time. 
Other introduced concepts which may present challenges, include: easements, because 
often the holder of the right over another's land has no land himself;70 adverse possession, 
because customary ownership is in perpetuity;71 mortgage, because there will rarely be a right 
  
67  Noel v Toto , above n 40. 
68  Land is an emotive political issue in most of the region.  Political parties which are elected into power 
are reluctant to jeopardize their position by suggesting land reforms, which may have to be radical and 
far reaching if they are to be effective to meet future needs. 
69  Tufele Liamotua v Mose, above n 44. 
70  Rights exercised over the land of another are often limited to an individual and his immediate family, 
and so cannot be public rights.  Similarly they rarely meet the usual requirements of a profit à prendre 
in gross. 
71  This is so even in the case of absentee landlords.  Although both historically and today land squatters 
claim title by virtue of long occupation, acquisition by adverse possession is rarely recognised. 
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for the mortgagee to both come into possession and sell the land; and in tort, trespass, because 
there may not be a person in possession eligible to bring the claim.  Lawyers aware of the land 
tenure context of the region have to be selective, and recognise what aspects of introduced land 
law will and will not work  
It must also be acknowledged that customary law and customary forms of land tenure will 
remain significant in the region and many of the issues relating to such land will not come 
before the highest courts of the region.  It is also evident however, that while land rights will 
remain important for the status and identity of people, the significance of land as a place to live 
or cultivate may diminish.72 Land is being exploited in different ways.  Increasingly, currency 
is entering the equation so that those who grant exploitation rights are in turn entering a 
domain not previously governed by customary law.73 
The cases demonstrate that introduced Common Law principles can be adapted to provide 
workable solutions to current problems provided judges are sufficiently aware of customary 
practices and local context, and that legal accommodation in plural legal systems can provide a 
sound foundation for future development. 
  
72  For example, if a custom owner can give land away to members of his family perpetual ownership 
may remain but in diminishing parcel – a point made by Kent J in Noel v Toto, above n 40.  Similarly if 
there is portion entitlement, for example to all males, then resources are going to be stretched with 
population growth.  Absence from but affinity with land it very evident in some Pacific countries, for 
example Niue, Samoa and the Cook Islands. 
73  This is a point remarked on by Brown, above n 43.  Whereas previously it might be inappropriate to 
hold a trustee of land liable to account to his people for misuse of custom land, where he holds money 
as a result of doing so this remedy may now be appropriate. 
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